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ABSTRACTS
PLEADING AND PA CICE-DEFECIVE COMMvnON CouNT.-In an ac-
tion of assumpsit, P seeks recovery from D for breach of contract. P
is a former employee of D. D demurred to both counts of P's
amended declaration. "The first count of the amended declara-
tion, which purports to be a common count, alleges that the de-
fendant on March 18, 1954, in Cabell County, was indebted to
the plaintiff in the sum of $38,000.00 for work and services per-
formed by the plaintiff over a long period of years for the benefit
of the defendant at its request; that $30,000.00 of the amount sued
for is due the plaintiff 'under a paid up Group Annuity Contract';
that $8,000.00 of the amount sued for is due the plaintiff for 'salary
and fringe benefits,'; that being so indebted the defendant, 'in con-
sideration thereof,' promised the plaintiff to pay him, on request,
the amount so due him, but that the defendant, though often re-
quested, has not paid, and refuses to pay, the amount due the
plaintiff, or any part of it, to the damage of the plaintiff in the
amount sued for of $38,000.00."
"The necessary allegations of the common count in general as-
sumpsit for . . . labor and services performed . . . are that the
defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in a designated sum of
money, that, being so indebted, in consideration of such indebted-
ness, the defendant promised to pay the sum so designated, and
that the defendant has failed and refused to do so."
"The essential allegations of a special count are the statement
of the contract, the consideration except when based upon an in-
strument in writing which imports a consideration, the promise, the
breach of contract, the damages, and, in certain instances, the in-
ducement for the contract."
Although portions of the first count are set forth in the estab-
lished form of a common count in general assumpsit, other allega-
tions thereiA show that $30,000.00 of the alleged indebtedness arises
from and is based upon an express or special contract and that the
residue of $8,000.00 likewise arises from and is based upon an express
or special contract. Here, the portions of the count which relate to
the special contracts are defective in that they do not sufficiently
allege the nature of the contract, the consideration, the promise of
the defendant, and the breach by the defendant. Had the allega-
tions as to the amounts of $30,000.00 and $8,000.00 been omitted,
the other allegations, being in the recognized form, would have
been sufficient to constitute a good common count in general as-
sumpsit for labor and services performed and would have been
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sufficient on demurrer. The addition of these allegations converted
the first count into a special count based upon two separate express
or special contracts. Held, that "As the count fails to set forth the
substance of these contracts, the consideration upon which each
is based, the promise of the defendant, and the breach of each
such contract, it is fatally defective and as it does not sufficiently
state a cause of action in either general or special assumpsit, the
demurrer to it should have been sustained". Wright v. Standard
Ultramarine and Color Co., 90 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1955).
This decision should serve as a strong caveat to those who draft
common counts. It shows that more than a mere surplusage may
result when the draftsman does not stay within the bounds of com-
mon count requirements.
G. H. W.
ToIs-ATracrnvE NuisaAqc DocrNE.-D refinery company
installed a ramp from a river bank to its docking facility where
barges with gasoline cargoes were moored for unloading. D knew
that boys sometimes played on their riverside premises. P, 9 years
old, and a group of companions noticed that a disconnected hose
on a barge was dripping gasoline into the river. They boarded the
barge and obtained some of the gasoline. Proceeding to their nor-
mal play area, they put some of the gasoline in a bottle and set
fire to a fuse which they had made with wrapped paper. When
the fuse burned down to the gasoline, the bottle burst open and
burning gasoline spilled on the ground. X, 14 years old, deliber-
ately threw gasoline on the fire while P was attempting to stamp
it out, and the resultant explosion burned P's leg. P sued D alleg-
ing that D maintained an "attractive nuisance" which was the
proximate cause of his injury. The district court gave judgment
for P.
On appeal, held, that West Virginia has repudiated the "attrac-
tive nuisance" doctrine. A less rigid doctrine has been employed
which emphasizes ".... that, in order for liability to exist, (1) the
presence of the child at the dangerous instrumentality must have
been either known or could have been reasonably anticipated; and
(2) the danger of the instrumentality must be hidden, concealed
or latent to one who is not familiar with its uses". Here, "there
was nothing latent about the danger resulting from the gasoline
flowing from the hose". Extraneous application of heat or flame
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